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Introduction
It is difficult to think of a more timely or important topic than
horizontal hydraulic fracturing and its impact on the environment. It
is especially useful to have an exchange of views on this subject now,
before the statutes, regulations, and court decisions start to roll in.
Law professors—I cannot speak for anyone else—have a strong
proclivity for backward-looking analysis, dissecting what should have
been done after the basic direction of the law is set and the courts have
spoken. It is much more useful to weigh the pros and cons of different
approaches at an early stage in the evolution of an issue, although
admittedly, it is also more risky. So I congratulate the Law Review on
organizing today’s conference.
Before I begin, it is appropriate to say a few words by way of
background about horizontal hyrdrofracturing, or “fracking” for short.
This will be familiar to many of you, but there may be others in the
audience who are relatively unversed in the subject, and some context
may help in following the debates on the various panels to come.
What exactly is fracking and why is it different from ordinary oil
and gas field production? I am not a petroleum engineer. But let me
offer my understanding, expressed in lay terms, for what it is worth.
Traditional production of oil and gas involves drilling a vertical
pipe from the surface to an oil or gas reservoir in the ground.1 Because
of the weight of the rock and soil above it, the oil or gas is under great
pressure. Once the pipe penetrates the reservoir, that pressure causes
the oil and gas to rise through the pipe to the surface, where it can be
gathered for commercial use. Reservoir is a bit of a misnomer here.
†

Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to
Dan Boyle for outstanding research assistance. This paper was presented as
the keynote address at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium,
The Law and Policy of Hydraulic Fracturing, November 16, 2012.

1.

See Energy in Brief: What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?,
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/
about_shale_gas.cfm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012).

971

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 63· Issue 4·2013
Four Questions About Fracking

Sometimes there is literally a pool of oil or gas trapped in a hollow
space between sedimentary layers of rock in the ground. But often
conventional oil and gas deposits are embedded in permeable rock. In
order to extract it, however, the rock must be sufficiently permeable
that oil and gas will flow through it, into the pipe and up to the
surface, once the deposit is penetrated by the pipe.
Petroleum engineers have long known that there is a great deal
of oil and gas in the ground that is trapped in rock that is not
permeable, and hence cannot be extracted by simple drilling of a
vertical pipe.2 In the parlance of the industry, the fissures that
contain the valuable material are too “tight” to flow. These engineers
have long sought a way to open up these fissures to let the trapped oil
and gas flow out.
One technology for doing this, known as hydraulic fracturing, has
been around for about sixty years and is now routinely used to
enhance the production from conventional oil and gas wells.3
Hydraulic fracturing involves pumping a fluid, sometimes called “slick
water,” down into the well under great pressure. The fluid is mostly
water mixed with some proppant like sand or small ceramic balls plus
a small amount of lubricating chemicals.4 The pressure from the water
fractures the rock, and the sand props the fractures open. The
fracturing fluid, or most of it at any rate, is then pumped out, and if
all goes well the oil or gas flows out behind it.
The recent innovation, which is responsible for all the stir,
consists of combining hydraulic fracturing with a relatively new
technology, horizontal drilling. This consists, as the name suggests, of
drilling down vertically and then, at some point, turning the drill bit
and moving horizontally through a seam of rock.5 Much of the oil and
gas in the ground that is trapped in nonpermeable rock is found in
relatively thin seams of coal or shale. A couple dozen years ago, a
number of independent gas producers started fiddling around with the
idea that you could combine horizontal drilling with hydraulic
fracturing, and this might be a way to extract gas from these thin
seams of coal or shale. They would drill down to the seam, turn the
pipe horizontally and thread it through the seam, and then inject the
2.

See Vikram Rao, Shale Gas: The Promise and the Peril 7 (2012).

3.

Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing
in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 122–23 (2009).

4.

Heather Cooley & Christina Donnelly, Pac. Inst., Hydraulic
Fracturing and Water Resources: Separating the Frack from
the Fiction 21 (2012) (detailing the variations in the composition of
fracking fluids to compensate for the specifics of local geology and
individual wells).

5.

See Leonardo Maugeri, Oil: The Next Revolution 42–44 (2012).
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seam with fracturing fluid. After a long period of trial and error, an
independent gas producer named George Mitchell, working in the
Barnett Shale field near Fort Worth, Texas, figured out the right
combination of horizontal drilling, pressure, and proppants to get the
gas flowing out of shale.6 Mitchell’s breakthrough came in 1998. His
success was observed by other producers, and they quickly emulated
his methods.
What was the impact of Mr. Mitchell’s successful innovation? It
now appears that it means nothing less than an enormous expansion
of the reserves of oil and gas in the United States. No one knows for
sure by how much.7 To some extent it depends on prices going
forward. It could mean a doubling of reserves; it could mean more.
The impact of this sudden surge in reserves is somewhat different
for gas and oil.8 Gas is transported primarily by pipeline, which means
the relevant market is regional or national. Gas, if you will, is a closed
market. An expansion of U.S. reserves of gas means a reduction in the
price of gas nationally.
Oil is bought and sold on a world market, so the impact is
different. A surge in oil reserves in the United States will yield some
stabilization of the price of oil in the United States, but not very much.
An expansion of reserves basically means more wealth for the United
States and less for the countries from which we currently import oil.
For both commodities, the sudden expansion of reserves means
more jobs in the oil and gas extraction industries. Exactly how many
more jobs is guesswork. President Obama, in his 2012 State of the
Union address, said 600,000 additional jobs.9 That is a big deal in a
soft employment economy. The unemployment rate in North Dakota,
where oil production using fracking technology is booming, is 3.7
percent, less than half the national average.10 Workers on oil rigs in
North Dakota can make $70,000 in five months.11 Supervisors earn
6.

Daniel Yergin, The Quest 325–32 (2011).

7.

The exact amount of unconventional oil reserves remain uncertain, but
recent estimates suggest the United States and Canada have a combined
1,301.7 billion barrels in total technically recoverable unconventional oil,
that is, oil that may or may not be economically recoverable at present.
In comparison, the proved reserves (oil that can be economically
recovered at current prices) for the entire world is assessed at 1,354.2
billion barrels. Amy Meyers Jaffe et al., The Status of World
Oil Reserves: Conventional and Unconventional Resources in
the Future Supply Mix 17–19 (Oct. 2011).

8.

Ernest J. Moniz, Henry J. Jacoby & Anthony J.M. Megs, MIT
Study on the Future of Natural Gas 7 (2011).

9.

President Barack H. Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2012).

10.

Eric Konigsberg, Kuwait on the Prairie, New Yorker, Apr. 25, 2011,
at 43.

11.

Id. at 50.
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$320,000 a year. Landowners in North Dakota who are lucky enough
to own two square miles of land in the Bakken shale area get $1
million up front and $500,000 a year in royalties, estimated to last
two decades.12
For gas there are other dramatic effects, because the closed
market means a fall in natural gas prices.13 This has lots of benefits.
Home heating bills go down. Electric bills are either stable or go
down. Chemical and fertilizer plants that consume lots of natural gas
or gas byproducts begin to move back to the United States. Some
heavy industry may move back or stay because of lower energy costs.
Other impacts of falling gas prices are of more ambiguous import.
I suspect that the fracking revolution probably means the end of the
nuclear power industry in the United States.14 Nuclear power cannot
compete against cheap gas as a source of combustion for power
generation. The fracking revolution also has the coal industry on the
ropes. The coal producers like to blame the Obama Administration
for launching a “war on coal,” but a bigger problem is that under
longstanding environmental regulations coal is less attractive as a
source of power generation than cheap gas. Perhaps more
problematically, lots of cheap gas also means the solar power industry
and the wind power industry will need continuing government
subsidies if they are to stay afloat.15 If budgetary stringencies mean
those subsidies are curtailed, they too could be done in by cheap gas.
On the oil front, the surge in domestic reserves will have less
impact, because the price of oil is fixed by supply and demand in the
world market, and the price will likely remain relatively high due to
rising demand in Asia and the developing world. But there will still be
big effects. U.S. imports of oil are way down, from 60 percent of total
oil consumption to about 40 percent. The recession and improvements
in fuel efficiency are partly responsible.16 But the surge in domestic
12.

Id. at 51.

13.

Natural Gas: An Unconventional Bonanza, Economist (Special
Report), July 14, 2012, at 1, 5–7.

14.

See Brad Plumer, Another Casualty of the Shale Gas Boom: Nuclear
Power, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/21/another-casualty-of-the-shale-gas-boomnuclear-power; David Biello, Is Nuclear Power Doomed to Dwindle?, Sci.
Am. (Feb. 5, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2013/
02/05/is-nuclear-power-doomed-to-dwindle.

15.

See Henry D. Jacoby et al., The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and
Environmental Policy, 1 Econ. Energy & Envtl. Pol’y 37, 49 (2012).

16.

In addition to surging domestic production, U.S. energy consumption is
holding flat or declining annually, magnifying the impact of decreased
imports. Short Term Energy Outlook, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/us_oil.cfm (last visited May
15, 2013).

974

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 63· Issue 4·2013
Four Questions About Fracking

production, especially from North Dakota, is perhaps the biggest
factor. North Dakota, almost overnight, now produces more oil than
Alaska and is second only to Texas among U.S. states, all due to
fracking technology.17 The impact on the balance of payments is
enormous—roughly $100 billion a year is now going to those lucky
workers and landowners in North Dakota rather than to Saudi
princes. The International Energy Agency in Paris estimates the U.S.
will be the largest producer of oil in the world by 2020, surpassing
Saudi Arabia.18 Energy independence, which every President since
Nixon has claimed to be a top national priority, suddenly is beginning
to look like less of a pipe dream.
So that is a capsule summary of fracking and why it is a very big
deal; a “game changer” to use the current cliché. To say that this has
come as a surprise to energy experts, politicians, and economists
would be an understatement. No one saw this coming.
As a startling and unforeseen development, the fracking revolution
presents a number of interesting questions. I will address four. These
are not the only significant questions presented by this surprise. But
they are ones that resonate particularly with me, a property and environmental law teacher. Here, in brief summary, are the four questions.
First, why did fracking technology, perhaps the most important
innovation in energy technology in a generation, emerge in the United
States rather than somewhere else? Answering this question may
provide some clues about the conditions that promote innovation in
developing new sources of energy more generally.
Second, are there any novel environmental risks presented by
fracking? Fracking undoubtedly poses environmental risks, but we
need to ascertain whether they are the kinds of risks that can be
addressed by ratcheting up existing regulatory regimes, or if
something entirely new is needed.
Third, if there are novel risks, what is the best regulatory strategy
for addressing those risks?
Fourth and finally, what should a concerned citizen anxious about
the prospect of global warming think about fracking? Is fracking
something to be opposed in order to promote a transition to alternative
energy, or is it something to be embraced as a bridge to a greener
future?

17.

Current North Dakota production is over 720,000 barrels per day,
behind only Texas, at approximately two million barrels per day. U.S.
Monthly Crude Oil Production Reaches Highest Level Since 1998, U.S.
Energy Info. Admin. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayin
energy/detail.cfm?id=9030; see also Russell Gold, Oil and Gas Bubble
Up All Over, Wall St. J., Jan 3, 2012, at A7.

18.

Int’l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, at 23 (2012).
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I.

Why Did the Fracking Revolution Happen Here?

On to the first question: why did the fracking revolution happen
in the United States rather than somewhere else?
Let us start with the role of the federal government. One possible
explanation can be easily eliminated. Current fracking technology was
not developed by the federal government. Over the years, the U.S.
Department of Energy has channeled billions of dollars in grants to
promote new sources of energy, ranging from nuclear fusion, to
synthetic fuels, to photovoltaic cells, to battery technology, to
hydrogen cars. Yet comparatively little in the way of research dollars
has been devoted to the development of new oil and gas extraction
techniques.19 The United States devotes more public money to energy
research than any other country, but fracking did not emerge out of
an Energy Department laboratory.
This does not mean the federal role was irrelevant. Although little
grant money went to developing fracking technology, the federal
government provided a valuable subsidy, in the form of a tax break.20
Tucked away in a 1980 tax bill designed primarily to impose a windfall
profits tax on oil and gas producers was a provision, known as section
29,21 that provided a special federal tax credit for drilling for so-called
unconventional natural gas. This special credit no doubt helped keep
several competing gas producers going in the 1990s in their quest for
technology to extract gas from the Barnett Shale in Texas. So the
federal government did not invent fracking, but perhaps it kept the
technology from dying before its time. Note, however, that the
government support did not take the form of the government picking
winners and losers. Rather, the primary form of support was a general
19.

From 1978 to 2010, approximately $3 billion in Department of Energy
Research and Development expenditures were focused on oil and gas. In
this same period, the Department of Energy devoted approximately $26
billion to coal, $45 billion to nuclear, and, more recently, $20 billion to
renewable energy generation. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Direct
Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in
Fiscal Year 2010, at 34 (2011).

20.

Federal spending related to fracking research equaled roughly $137
million over three decades, primarily in the 1970s—well before the major
successes of recent years. But tax breaks supporting fracking pioneers
were substantial, totaling over $10 billion from 1980 to the present.
Kevin Begos, Early On, Fracking Got Injection of Federal Funding, Tax
Breaks, Wash. Times, Sep. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2012/sep/23/early-on-fracking-got-injection-of-federal-funding.

21.

Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 231(a),
94 Stat. 229, 268 (formerly codified at I.R.C. § 29; now codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 45k (2006)). See generally Mark A. Muntean,
Rebirth of a Tax Credit: An Overview of Code Section 29, 27 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 235 (1986).
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tax credit, broadly available to anyone who could claim to be drilling
for unconventional gas. In effect, the decision to take the subsidy was
made unilaterally by individual producers, each of whom could
choose, based on its own calculus, whether to take up the subsidy or
leave it on the table.
What about industry structure? Another possibility that can be
eliminated is that the innovation came from the research department
of one of the major oil companies that continually advertise their
commitment to energy innovation on TV. It is true that many of the
majors are American, and that these companies invest huge sums of
money searching for new sources of energy and new ways of
extracting it. But the critical breakthrough in the development of
fracking technology was not developed by a major. It was achieved in
the late 1990s through a trial-and-error process doggedly pursued by
George Mitchell’s energy company, an independent gas producer.22
Mitchell’s company was not exactly a pipsqueak in the energy world;
it sold for $3.5 billion to another independent firm once the potential
value of fracking in the Barnett Shale area became apparent.23 But
Mitchell had nothing comparable to the resources or the engineering
talent of the major oil companies.
I would emphasize several other factors about oil and gas production in the United States which I think were indirectly responsible for
the fracking revolution. One is that mineral rights in the United
States are predominantly privately owned. The United States follows
the so-called ad coelum rule, by which the owner of land is deemed to
own the air rights above the land and the subsurface rights below the
land.24 Ownership of the subsurface rights includes the right to extract
“fugacious” minerals found by drilling down into the subsurface
column below the land, including oil, gas, and groundwater. This is
why, in the Beverly Hillbillies, the discovery of oil under the Clampett
farm leads to the family moving to Beverly Hills. The United States is
something of an outlier in this regard. Most other countries follow the
rule that subsurface minerals belong to the state, and so permission from
the government is required to engage in subsurface mineral development.
Why might private ownership of subsurface mineral rights
translate into greater innovation in drilling technology? You might be
thinking—“greed.” But I am not sure the governments that control
22.

See Yergin, supra note 6, at 325–28.

23.

Jesse Bogan, The Father of Shale Gas, Forbes (Jul. 16, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/16/george-mitchell-gas-business-energyshale.html.

24.

63c Am. Jur. 2d Property § 12 (2009); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14
J. Legal Stud. 13, 16, 26–36 (1985); Peter M. Gerhart & Robert D.
Cheren, Recognizing the Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource
Pools, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1041, 1045–46, 1048–50 (2013).
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mineral rights development in other parts of the world are necessarily
more public spirited than the landowners who agree to enter into leases
of their mineral rights to oil and gas production companies. I would
emphasize something else—decentralization of control. In a country
like the United States that follows the ad coelum rule, ownership and
hence control over subsurface minerals is fragmented among tens of
thousands of separate owners. A production company that wants to
experiment with an innovative technology can always find an owner
sufficiently willing to take risks—or if you are more cynical,
sufficiently ignorant of the risks—to convey the required rights. When
mineral rights are owned by the government, access is necessarily
controlled by a centralized bureaucracy. Bureaucracies tend to be
slow and cautious. Promoting innovative extraction technologies that
could easily end up a bust is difficult to explain to the boss.
A very rough and admittedly inconclusive empirical confirmation
of this point is provided by looking at a map of the United States
where fracking activity is underway, and comparing it to a map
showing areas of land and associated mineral rights that are controlled
by the federal government. There is very little overlap. It could be, of
course, that it just happens that there are few promising shale
deposits under federal lands. But this is almost certainly not the
explanation. Oil and gas producers have simply concluded that dealing
with private owners is far easier than dealing with the bureaucracy in
the Department of the Interior25—or waiting for the lawsuits to be
resolved if and when the Department agrees to start leasing.26
Another factor that helps explain the fracking revolution is that
regulation of oil and gas production in the United States is largely a
matter of state rather than federal law. The explanation for this is
historical. Oil and gas production developed well before the 1970s,
when federal environmental law came on the scene.27 Oil and gas
25.

Rules for fracking on federal land have been repeatedly delayed, largely
due to political pressures. While the Department of the Interior floated
proposed rules for fracking on federal lands in May 2012, extensive
public comments ensured there would be no final rules published before
the 2012 presidential election. Ben Geman, Interior Delays ‘Fracking’
Rules, The Hill (Dec. 11, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2wire/e2-wire/272307-interior-pushes-back-fracking-rule-timeline.

26.

A harbinger of the future here may be Center for Biological Diversity v.
Bureau of Land Management, No. C 11-06174 PSG, 2013 WL 1405938
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2013), in which a magistrate judge has held that the
Interior Department cannot enter into leases that contemplate the use of
fracking on federal lands until a full-blown Environmental Impact
Statement is prepared that takes a “hard look” at the environmental
risks associated with this technology. Id. at *6.

27.

This dramatic expansion of the federal role in environmental protection
largely began with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
declaring “a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoya-
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regulation was traditionally a state matter, and was primarily oriented toward maximizing production, not controlling environmental
harms.28 Probably because regulatory structures were already in place
at the state level when the environmental revolution got underway,
federal environmental regulation has largely left this system of state
regulation untouched.29
Why does state regulation help foster technological innovation?
You may be thinking state regulation equals lax regulation. But not all
federal regulation is strict, and not all state regulation lax. Again, the
more apt significance of state regulation is that regulatory oversight of
the oil and gas industry is decentralized. Different states have different
approaches, meaning regulators in some states are more tolerant of
experimental or innovative production technologies than regulators in
others.30 Again, this differs from other nations, where regulation of the
oil and gas industry tends to be much more centralized.
Why does decentralized regulation promote innovation? The
theory that explains this might go as follows. All regulators tend to be
risk averse.31 If things go well, they get no credit. If things go badly,
they get blamed. But the degree of risk aversion of regulators falls
along a spectrum. Some are more risk averse than others. Where
regulation is decentralized, a new technology like fracking can find at
least one or two states where it is allowed to get going. This sets in
motion a natural experiment. If the results are good, and the risks do
not seem too great, then risk-averse regulators in other states will give

ble harmony between man and his environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
See generally Michael J. Graetz, The End of Energy 41–59 (2011).
28.

Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and Administrative Regulation of
Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 837, 838
(2012) (“[T]he decades of the 1930s and 1940s became ones where states
responded to the lack of federal regulation with the enactment of state
oil and gas conservation statutes that delegated to state agencies
broadened powers to regulate the oil and gas industry.”).

29.

What federal regulation there is of the oil and gas industry tends to focus
on specific incidents, such as oil spills, see 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006 & Supp.
V. 2011), or on the types of activity that oil and gas companies happen to
engage in, such as the transportation of chemicals. We do not see the form
of cradle-to-grave regulations present for industries as in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6901–6992k (2006) (regulating
the transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes).

30.

See Christopher S. Kulander, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1101 (2013)
(describing current regulatory regimes in major fracking states).

31.

See William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80
Minn. L. Rev. 35, 91–93 (1995) (discussing risk avoidance in
bureaucracy, using the example of the EPA).
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it the green light to go ahead there, too.32 If the results are not so
good, or the risks seem too large, then the regulators in other states
will throw up roadblocks to the new technology, and the experiment
will wither away. In a more centralized regulatory environment, which
tends to be the norm in other parts of the world, the experiment is
less likely to get off the ground in the first place. This is because the
median regulator is risk averse. And being the only regulatory game
in town, the risk aversion of the median regulator is likely to translate
into hostility to technological innovation.
The last structural feature of the United States I will mention is
the highly developed infrastructure of pipelines, and the practice of
treating pipelines like common carriers open to all.33 This allows small
producers without their own pipelines or without significant economic
or political clout to gain access to markets. Again, the situation in
other parts of the world is very different, where pipelines are either
owned by the government or are not regarded as common carriers
accessible to all.34 One could say the United States has an open
infrastructure in energy markets, at least on this dimension, and that
this allows experimentation by small firms to flourish.
So if I had to sum up the factors that explain why the United
States developed fracking technology before anyone else, I would say
in one word: decentralization. Specifically, decentralization of control
over resource development. One case study does not prove the general
32.

Critics of state regulation often raise the specter of industry capture at
local or state levels, yet nothing at this point suggests those risks are
greater than they would be at the federal level. David B. Spence,
Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 507 (2013) (“There is no evidence
to suggest that the states’ varying approaches to [fracking] questions
reflect industry capture; an equally likely explanation is that each state
is balancing the costs and benefits of development differently.”).

33.

Interstate oil pipelines have been classified as common carriers since
1906. Hepburn Act, Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (amending
the Interstate Commerce Act’s common carrier provisions to apply to
“the transportation of oil or other commodity, except water and except
natural or artificial gas, by means of pipe lines”); see also Christopher J.
Barr, Unfinished Business, FERC’s Evolving Standard for Capacity
Rights on Oil Pipelines, 32 Energy L.J. 563, 567–68 (discussing the
history and statutory basis for oil pipelines’ common carrier status
under the Interstate Commerce Act). Interstate gas pipelines were
excepted from the common carrier requirements of the Interstate
Commerce Act, but beginning in the 1980s, a series of Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission regulations provided gas producers with open
access to pipelines. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (2012).

34.

See, e.g., Dylan Cors, Breaking the Bottleneck: The Future of Russia’s
Oil Pipelines, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 597, 606 (1997) (comparing
pipeline regulation in the United States with Russian and European
legal regimes).
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point. But the fracking revolution is at least a cautionary tale for
those who assume that overarching federal energy policy is the key to
innovation in energy. It may be that private property rights,
entrepreneurialism, local control, and the absence of federal
bureaucracy make a better recipe for the development of “game
changing” technological breakthroughs.

II. Does Fracking Present Any Novel Risks?
The second question I will address is whether fracking presents
any novel environmental problems that warrant a change in our
existing systems of environmental regulation. Why the emphasis on
novel risks? The following thought experiment may be useful. Imagine
a discovery in the United States of new conventional sources of oil
and gas equivalent in magnitude to the additional reserves of oil and
gas brought on line by fracking. In other words, imagine we discover a
huge new deposit of oil and gas in some backwater area of the country
that somehow had been overlooked all these years. How, if at all, do
the risks posed by fracking differ from the kinds of risks that would be
associated with an upsurge in oil and gas production using conventional
techniques? This question is important because it tells us whether we
need new laws and regulations to deal with fracking. To the extent
fracking-generated production is no different than a surge in
conventional production, the solution is presumably to ratchet up the
existing regulatory framework for oil and gas production to meet the
challenges of the new surge in production. If, however, fracking is
associated with new risks that have no parallel under conventional
production, then we have to start thinking about developing a new
regulatory framework to deal with these new risks.
The environmental bill of indictment against fracking is a long
one. Among the members of some environmental advocacy groups, I
suspect that the most telling charge is that fracking, by giving us
cheap gas, will delay the process of converting to renewables, and
hence will compromise efforts to reduce the risk of climate change.35
This issue is sufficiently important that I will postpone it to question
four. For many landowners who own property in the vicinity of
prospective fracking operations, the most critical concern is that
fracking will contaminate groundwater aquifers, thereby jeopardizing
water supplies and property values.36 Fracking fluid contains a small
percentage of chemicals, some of which, like arsenic, are known toxics
and others of which, like benzene, are known carcinogens. If these
chemicals find their way into the groundwater, they could pose a
health risk or at the very least would seriously impair property values.
35.

See Jacoby et al., supra note 15.

36.

See Wiseman, supra note 3, at 131–32.
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Other charges are that fracking operations will damage local roads
due to heavy truck traffic, cause air pollution due to releases from
poorly controlled wells or containment ponds, place unsustainable
demands on local water supplies, damage wildlife habitat by requiring
the construction of new pipelines, and even cause earthquakes.37 The
question is which if any of these risks requires the development of new
regulatory systems.
Virtually all of these risks are matters of real concern. But many
are the kinds of externalities that would be generated by an upsurge
in conventional oil and gas production. Here I would include truck
traffic, air pollution, and habitat destruction from pipelines. There is
no reason to believe these problems cannot be addressed by adapting
existing forms of regulation to meet the new challenges. Surges in
truck traffic can be met by new limits on the weight or type of
vehicles or by user fees on those that use heavy trucks on back
country roads. Air pollution can be addressed by new types of
stationary source controls on gas and oil wells—something that the
EPA is already moving toward doing.38 Habitat destruction can be
controlled by applying local land use controls and the Endangered
Species Act.39
Among the risks that are unique to fracking include its voracious
consumption of water. But the demand for water used in fracking
appears to be manageable in areas like Pennsylvania and Ohio where
surface water, which is renewable, is used.40 In areas like West Texas
where groundwater must be tapped, existing permitting schemes can
be used to allocate scarce local water supplies. Ideally, increased
recycling of fracking fluid will reduce the demand on water supplies
nearly everywhere.41 Earthquake risks fall in the category of “more

37.

See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia,
21 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 229, 254–56 (2010) (detailing surface impacts of
fracking operations).

38.

In 2012, the EPA issued regulations aimed at curbing emissions from oil
and gas production sites, specifically targeting fracking operations. See
Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77
Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).

39.

See Kalyani Robbins, Awakening the Slumbering Giant: How Horizontal
Drilling Technology Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear on
Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143 (2013).

40.

Local authorities in these areas have shown willingness to manage water
usage by fracking operations by changing consumption rates or
suspending usage. See Cooley & Donnelly, supra note 4, at 16
(describing state responses to water withdrawal for fracking operations).

41.

States regulating fracking operations increasingly require or encourage
wastewater recycling and reclamation. These requirements may become
increasingly widespread, as they decrease pressure on local water sources
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study required.”42 The most prominently discussed episode, from
Ohio, involved injection of spent fracking fluid into deep geologic
formations, not fracking operations themselves.43 If deep injection of
spent fluid causes earthquakes, then plans to require carbon
sequestration by deep injection of CO2 also need to be reexamined. So
this may not be a problem, or may be a problem not unique to fracking.
The water contamination risks are the matter of greatest concern
to local landowners and loom large in the public imagination. They
are also a category of risk that presents a plausible claim to being
novel or unprecedented. The matter is complicated by the variety of
potential pathways of water contamination.44 The pathway that has
received the most attention is the prospect that fracking fluid injected
into deep shale formations might migrate upward through fractures
into groundwater aquifers. There is currently no documented instance
of this happening,45 and most experts think it highly unlikely.46 The
and decrease the need to dispose of waste water. See Wiseman, supra
note 37, at 267–68 & n.245.
42.

As of yet, the connections between fracking operations and earthquakes
are unclear. While it has long been known that oil and gas extraction
generally may cause increased seismic activity, the only United States
Geological Survey study on the question did not find that fracking
presents a greater than normal risk for these events. See News Release,
David J. Hayes, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Is the Recent
Increase in Felt Earthquakes in the Central US Natural or Manmade?
(Apr. 11, 2012) (“USGS’s studies do not suggest that hydraulic
fracturing, commonly known as ‘fracking,’ causes the increased rate of
earthquakes. USGS’s scientists have found, however, that at some
locations the increase in seismicity coincides with the injection of
wastewater in deep disposal wells.”); see also Nat’l Research Council,
Induced Seismicity Potential in Energy Technologies 156 (2012)
(reaching similar conclusions).

43.

See Mark Niquette, Ohio Tries to Escape Fate as Dumping Ground for
Fracking Fluid, Bloomberg (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/ohio-tries-to-escape-fate-as-a-dumpingground-for-fracking-fluid.html.

44.

Moniz, Jacoby & Megs, supra note 8, at 7 (“Shale development requires
large-scale fracturing of the shale formation to induce economic
production rates. There has been concern that these fractures can also
penetrate shallow freshwater zones and contaminate them with
fracturing fluid, but there is no evidence that this is occurring.”).

45.

The most recent United States Geological Survey assessment of 127
sample wells in the Fayetteville Shale area of Arkansas found no
evidence that fracking operations had contaminated local groundwater,
despite over 4,000 drilling operations in the vicinity. Timothy M.
Kresse et al., U.S. Geological Survey, Shallow Groundwater
Quality and Geochemistry in the Fayetteville Shale GasProduction Area, North-Central Arkansas (2011); see also
Ayesha Rascoe, No Contamination from Fracking Found in 2 Arkansas
Counties-USGS, Reuters (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://www.
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basic reason is that shale seams are typically very deep, up to a mile
underground, and the enormous weight of rock and soil above these
seams will compress any fractures that might otherwise allow fracking
fluid to migrate upward.47 Still, fracking involves the uncontrolled
release of toxic chemicals—underground and out of sight. This makes
people understandably nervous, and with good reason. We have had
other experience recently with assurances from experts that
complicated and novel activities—like buying and selling collateralized
debt obligations—pose no risk, and we have lived to regret it.
Another pathway of contamination might be from deep geologic
formations where spent fluid is injected. Again, the depth of the
injection, the lack of porosity in overlying rock, and the natural force
of gravity make contamination of aquifers much closer to the surface
unlikely. But the uncontrolled nature of the injection of waste
chemicals causes apprehension.
Other potential pathways of contamination have elicited less
public attention but may present greater risks. Improper sealing of
vertical drilling pipes could allow fracking fluid to escape at depths

reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/usa-fracking-arkansas-study-idUSL1E9C
9FCZ20130110. A 2011 Duke University study of wells in the Marcellus
Shale area of Pennsylvania found elevated methane levels, but no signs
of fracking fluids or chemicals in the groundwater. Steven G. Osborne et
al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well
Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 8172
(2011). The Duke study’s authors later theorized that methane may be
moving through previously unknown, naturally occurring pathways,
resulting in unforeseen migration. Nathaniel R. Warner et al.,
Geochemical Evidence for Possible Natural Migration of Marcellus
Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 Proc. Nat’l
Acad. Sci. 11961 (2012).
46.

A 2011 Department of Energy study “share[d] the prevailing view that the
risk of fracturing fluid leakage into groundwater sources through fractures
made in deep shale reservoirs is remote.” Shale Gas Prod. Subcomm.,
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Second Ninety Day Report 17 (2011).

47.

Only one study has suggested that shale seams may be more permeable
than previously estimated, and thus susceptible to fracking fluid
migration. But this study relied entirely on computer modeling and no
field data, drawing strong criticism from other experts. This illustrates
one of the major difficulties in determining the risks of groundwater
contamination—understanding the geology of shale formations more
than a mile deep is limited, and the subject is difficult to research. See
Tom Meyers, Potential Contaminant Pathways From Hydraulically
Fractured Shale to Aquifers, 50 Ground Water 872 (2012); see also
Abrahm Lustgarten, New Study Predicts Frack Fluids Can Migrate to
Aquifers Within Years, Pro Publica (May 1, 2012, 3:29 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/new-study-predicts-frack-fluids-canmigrate-to-aquifers-within-years (reviewing the Meyers study and
criticizing its methodology).
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much closer to aquifers.48 Improper lining of surface containments
could lead to leaching of fluid into groundwater, as could unprotected
blowouts. Accidental spills from trucks are always a possibility. It is
also possible that fracking activity might disturb pockets of methane
gas closer to surface aquifers, or could agitate sediment in the bottom
of water wells, which would then contaminate the well water.49
Collectively, the water contamination risks are relatively novel
and have elicited a fair degree of anxiety. Regulations of the “best
practices” variety designed to minimize the risk of leaking from
improperly sealed vertical pipes, or from blowouts, or from surface
containment ponds, are both feasible and desirable. But there is no
known technology to reduce the risks from many of the potential
pathways of contamination—including the scariest, if the most
remote, risks presented by injection of fracking fluid into deep shale
seams or into geologic formations for disposal.
So I would conclude that the water contamination risks are novel
and do not have any close parallel in conventional oil and gas
production. The experts may be right that based on geology the risks
of contamination from deep injection are close to zero. But only time
will tell for sure. In the meantime, nearly everyone who draws water
from an aquifer above or in the vicinity of fracking activity is a guinea
pig. We need to put in place some regulatory system to address the
risks of water contamination associated with the uncontrolled release
or injection of fracking fluid. And since all pathways of contamination
pose risks unique to fracking, we should adopt a regulatory structure
broad enough to address those risks, too.

III. How Should We Address Novel Fracking Risks?
The third question is, given that fracking presents novel issues of
water contamination, what sort of regulatory system should be put in
place to address those risks? David Schizer, my colleague and dean at
Columbia Law School, and I are writing a paper about this.50 Let me
offer some of the highlights of our argument.
48.

See Osborn et al., supra note 45.

49.

This problem of sediment disturbance may explain why numerous
reported cases of alleged fracking contamination turn out to be incorrect.
The drilling process has been found to agitate preexisting sediment,
making water appear dirty or unsafe, without any evidence of fracturing
chemicals in the water. Elizabeth W. Boyer et al., Ctr. for
Rural Pa., The Impact of Marcellus Gas Drilling on Rural
Drinking Water Supplies (2011) (comparing water wells before and
after fracking; finding no change in methane, but finding an increase in
sediment and iron in water).

50.

Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution,
Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy,
98 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013).
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The first issue is whether to adopt a system of ex ante or ex post
regulation.51 Ex ante regulation tries to head off harm before it occurs.
Ex post regulation puts a price on harm after it occurs. In many
contexts, ex ante is better, particularly if we have significant
information about harms and how to prevent them.
We do not, however, have good information at present about the
expected magnitude and incidence of water contamination caused by
fracking. With respect to the central source of anxiety—the risks of
migration of contaminants from shale rock formations to nearby
aquifers—we have a classic he-said, she-said situation. The industry
says the risk is basically nonexistent.52 The environmentalists say the
harm could be catastrophic.53 Until we have more actual experience
with horizontal fracking, we will not know for sure who is right.
Nor do we have good options for controlling the incidence of
contamination, certainly not from all potential pathways of
contamination. We know how producers can minimize the risks of
contamination from surface activities, like leaky containment tanks or
spills from trucks. But we are basically in the dark about how to
minimize the risks from fracking activity itself. Again, over time some
consensus views will probably emerge about best practices. But for
the moment, producers are in a learning-by-doing mode. Without
better information, it is impossible to design a sensible system of ex
ante regulation.
The environmentalists would say, when in doubt apply the
precautionary principle.54 But the only type of ex ante regulation we
51.

The factors differentiating ex ante and ex post regulation often parallel
the arguments regarding rules and standards in law. See generally Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Approach, 42 Duke
L.J. 557 (1992); see also Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal
Sanctions, and the Choice Between Ex-post Liability and Ex-ante
Regulation, 24 Int’l Rev L. & Econ. 29 (2004).

52.

Recent statements by Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, to Forbes
magazine provide an example of this industry position: “[T]he
precautionary principle will absolutely undermine the economy. . . . If
you want to live by the precautionary principle, then crawl up in a ball
and live in a cave.” Brian O’Keefe, Exxon’s Big Bet on Shale Gas, CNN
Money (Apr. 16, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/
04/16/exxon-shale-gas-fracking.

53.

See, e.g., Statement of Allison Chin, President of the Sierra Club (July
28, 2012), available at http://content.sierraclub.org/naturalgas (“No
state has adequate protections in place. Even where there are rules, they
are poorly monitored and enforced. Thanks to the multiple federal
exemptions, we can’t even count on the federal government to keep us
safe.”); Amy Mall, Safe Fracking Is a Fairy-Tale—The Latest Science
from Europe, EcoWatch (Oct. 11, 2012), http://ecowatch.org/2012/
safe-fracking-a-fairy-tale.

54.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Worst Case Scenarios 119 (2009) (“When
risks have catastrophic worst-case scenarios, it makes sense to take
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could possibly adopt given the dearth of information about expected
harms and control measures would be to impose a moratorium on
fracking until further information is gathered about its potential
adverse effects. You could call this the New York solution.55
Sometimes moratoriums make sense, given what we know about the
likely benefits and risks of an activity. For example, I would probably
agree that it makes sense to put a moratorium on human cloning
until we know more about the implications.
But with respect to fracking, a complete moratorium does not
seem very sensible. For one thing, hydraulic fracturing has been used
with conventional vertical wells for sixty years, without any notable
adverse effects. For another, the scientific explanation for why upward
migration of fracking fluids will not occur seems plausible and has
been endorsed in principle by expert panels at the EPA and Energy
Department.56 To be sure, adding horizontal drilling to fracturing
increases the risk of subsurface contamination. But it does not change
the risk very much with respect to surface contamination, except
insofar as the total amount of fracking activity goes up. In any event,
it is too late to impose a moratorium on fracking where it is already
underway, which is lots of places.
Under the circumstances, the only feasible way to regulate the
novel water contamination risks presented by fracking is ex post.
Practically speaking, that means some kind of liability rule for water
contamination that can be causally linked to fracking activity after it
occurs. David Schizer and I have an elaborate discussion of what an
optimal liability regime would look like.57 It would feature rules
designed to encourage the development of and compliance with best
practices regulations, mandatory baseline testing of water quality to
help resolve causation questions, attorney fee shifting for successful
claimants, and the posting of bonds or evidence of insurance to
contend with insolvency risks. Ideally, it would be established by
legislation, most likely at the state rather than the federal level. And
such ideal legislation, we suggest, would provide for an expeditious
and inexpensive administrative system for processing claims.

special measures to eliminate those risks, even when existing information
does not enable regulators to make a reliable judgment about the
probability that the worst-case scenarios will occur.”).
55.

New York State has imposed an effective moratorium on all fracking
activity in the state. While rules permitting fracking have been drafted
by the state Department of Environmental Conservation, vocal
opposition from environmental groups has led to a sort of regulatory
paralysis. See Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo on Gas Drilling Prompts
Both Anger and Praise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2012, at A1.

56.

See Shale Gas Prod. Subcomm., supra note 46.

57.

Merrill & Schizer, supra note 50.
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Unfortunately, the ideal is almost certainly unattainable. The sad
truth about environmental harms, recognized some years ago by Jim
Krier in a little essay entitled The End of the World News, is that
legislatures will not act until there is incontrovertible evidence of a link
between some activity and a real, tangible harm.58 Abstract demonstration of a risk will not do. I am reasonably confident this is true of
fracking. Until there is an irrefutable demonstration that subsurface
fracking activity has led to a water contamination disaster, we are not
going to see legislation prescribing a liability regime, ideal or not.
Happily enough, all is not lost, because we have a nonideal
liability regime that can be dusted off and applied to any water
contamination episodes that may occur: the common law of torts. The
common law of torts does not have all the features that Schizer and I
recommend, such as fee shifting, the posting of bonds, and
administrative adjudication. But it is not beyond the realm of
imagination to think that the common law, when applied to alleged
water contamination due to fracking, could be applied in such a way as
to approach the kind of liability system we would consider desirable.
With respect to the standard of care for example, the common
law has a number of doctrines that can be deployed to encourage the
development and compliance with best practices regulations. Violation
of a best practices rule should be negligence per se. Compliance with a
rule should give rise to a regulatory compliance defense. And for
harms that remain untouched by any best practices regulation, res
ispa loquitur would be appropriate. Practically speaking, this last
doctrinal move would be tantamount to a kind of strict liability. This,
we argue, is appropriate, in part to create incentives for producers to
adjust activity levels and to keep searching for innovative ways to
minimize harms.
A somewhat similar story can be told about proof of causation.
Ordinarily, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation. This
could prove to be an almost insuperable barrier in a water
contamination case, without evidence about the quality of the water
before fracking activity took place.59 Thus, an ideal liability scheme
58.

James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
851, 852 (1994).

59.

The complications of proving groundwater contamination are present in
both litigation and scientific studies. Identifying the specific source of
methane is difficult by itself, and litigants can rarely prove that methane
contamination is not naturally occurring. At best, parties may show that
methane contamination derives from a general area, such as the Marcellus
Shale, which may not be sufficient to prove causation. An example of this
issue has been seen in the disputes surrounding water contamination in
Dimock, Pennsylvania. See Mark Drajem & Jim Efstthiou, Cabot’s
Methodology Links Tainted Water Wells to Gas Fracking, Bloomberg
(Oct. 2, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-02/
cabot-s-methodology-links-tainted-water-wells-to-gas-fracking.html.
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would require baseline testing, mandatory disclosure of fracking
chemicals, and perhaps even the mandatory use of harmless tracer
chemicals in fracking fluid, all of which would dramatically lower the
barriers to establishing causation.60
A common law court obviously could not mandate all these
things, certainly not before any suit was filed. But a clever court
might be able to adopt some presumptions about causation, which
would have the effect of creating salutary incentives for baseline
testing. Thus, a court could create a presumption of causation if the
producer did not obtain water samples before fracking begins. This
would create an incentive to obtain and secure samples as part of the
lease negotiation process. And if any landowner refused to cooperate
in the taking of water samples, the court could create a counterpresumption of no causation, should that landowner later decide to
sue for water contamination. So with a little creativity, the common
law court might make some progress on the causation front.
The common law has the further virtue that any issue that is
likely to come up in a liability regime will have come up in some form
in the common law. Thus, questions about defenses based on plaintiff
misconduct, joint and several liability, the measure of damages, the
enforcement of judgments, and so forth, will all have some off-theshelf answer under the common law. Any legislated liability rule
would undoubtedly be incomplete, and would have to draw on the
common law by analogy in any event.
Finally, it is also worth noting that state legislatures often
legislate on discrete issues that arise in the course of common law
adjudication, in an effort to facilitate better results. If I could single
out one issue that I would have the legislature weigh in on, it would
be to require baseline sampling of local water supplies before fracking
begins. Of course, given the Krier rule—that no environmental
legislation is forthcoming until harmful effects are established—even
this may be too much to hope for.61 But it would be worth trying to
secure such legislation, and this might be something that both
producers and local opponents could agree upon as a step toward
alleviating uncertainty about the effects of fracking.

IV. How Will Fracking Impact Climate Change?
My fourth question is: what should a concerned citizen worried
about climate change think of fracking?

60.

Chris Mooney, The Truth About Fracking, Sci. Am., Nov. 2011, at 80,
85 (describing the introduction of tracers into fracking fluid mixtures as
“relatively easy,” but facing industry opposition).

61.

James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin, Pollution and Policy 1–3, 11 (1977).
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Global warming is a global phenomenon. This means that what
happens in one part of the world may not do much to stop global
warming, if it is offset by an equal and opposite change in another part
of the world. Let me offer an example: Europeans, who care quite a bit
about climate change, have aggressively pushed alternative energy
sources like solar and wind power. To pay for this, they have required
ratepayers to subsidize solar and wind producers through higher rates
on electricity.62 Higher rates on electricity have accelerated the
movement of industry from Europe to Asia, where operating costs are
lower. But in Asia, electricity is predominantly produced by power
plants that burn coal. So subsidizing alternative energy sources in
Europe may lead to higher rather than lower greenhouse gas emissions
on a global basis, as industrial activity shifts from Europe to Asia.
How does this relate to the fracking revolution in the United
States? Let’s start with the evidence about the trend in greenhouse
gas emissions in the last seven years on three continents: Asia,
Europe, and North America. In Asia, greenhouse gas emissions are up
quite a bit, as China and other Asian countries rapidly industrialize
and have built thousands of coal-burning power plants to generate the
electricity needed to power this industrialization process.63 In Europe,
greenhouse gas emissions are at best stable or a bit worse.64 Why is
that? Gas is expensive in Europe, and is subject to uncertainty
because much of it comes from Russia.65 Nuclear is on the outs after
62.

Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: Renewable Energy and Carbon
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 Duke Envtl.
L. & Pol’y F. 125, 169–71, (2010) (describing the operation of the
feed-in tariff system used by EU member states to subsidize renewable
energy).

63.

See Jonathan Kaiman, China’s Emissions Expected to Rise Until 2030,
Despite Ambitious Green Policies, Guardian (London), Nov. 26, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/nov/26/china-emissionsrise-green-policies.

64.

See Fiona Harvey, EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise Despite Climate
Change Policies, Guardian (London) May 30, 2012, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/30/european-union-greenhouseemissions-rise. Greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union are
based on Kyoto Convention targets relative to base years set by member
states, with most EU states using 1990 as their base year. Because
general advances in fuel efficiency have driven down emissions since
1990, EU member states are considered on-target for reducing emissions,
even as their year-to-year emissions rise and fall. See EU Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Targets, EU Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/g-gas/index_en.htm (last visited May 15, 2013). In contrast, the
U.S. Energy Information Administration measures American emissions
relative to 2005 levels, so reductions may be more statistically significant.

65.

Natural gas prices in the United States have dropped as low as $3 per
million British thermal units, but generally settle close to $4. In Europe,
per unit prices have ranged from $8–$12 in recent years. Global Natural
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Chernobyl and Fukishima. Renewables are expensive and as yet are a
relatively small part of the picture. So for a variety of reasons, Europe
is burning more coal to generate electricity.
The good news is the United States, where greenhouse gas
emissions have fallen significantly in the last seven years.66 This is a
country with no comprehensive climate change policy, and yet it has
seen better CO2 reductions than many other Western nations. What
gives? Some of the progress in the United States is due to the
economic slump and improvements in fuel efficiency of cars. The most
important contributor, however, is the big shift in power generation
from coal to natural gas, spurred by the cheap gas generated by the
fracking revolution.67 Power plants that run on natural gas emit about
50 percent of the greenhouse gases emitted by plants generated by
coal. So the displacement of coal plants by cheap natural gas fired
plants in the United States has given us the winning report card in
terms of recent progress in controlling greenhouse gas emissions.68
What if anything can we conclude from this? Not a great deal,
unfortunately. If the United States gets a B+ for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions because of a shift from coal to gas, this will matter not
in the larger picture if the United States continues to outsource
industrial production to China, which generates power using coal. In
order for natural gas to make a truly significant contribution to
greenhouse gas emissions on a global basis, it would be necessary to
Gas Prices Vary Considerably, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Sep. 30,
2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3310.
66.

See Benoit Faucon & Keith Johnson, U.S. Redraws World Oil Map,
Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 2012, at A1 (quoting estimate of International
Energy Agency). Greenhouse gas emissions in the United States have
declined approximately 7 percent from 2005 levels. This decline is
remarkable by itself, yet future trends are even more surprising: by
current Energy Information Agency estimates, greenhouse gas emissions
are expected to remain below 2005 levels through 2035. Joel Kirkland,
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emission Decline Despite Political Gridlock, Sci.
Am. (Jan 25, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=usgreenhouse-gas-emissions-decline-despite-political-gridlock.

67.

See U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions in Early 2012 Lowest Since
1992, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7350.

68.

This judgment is complicated by the fact that more gas production
means more methane leaking into the atmosphere, and methane is itself
a potent (but relatively more short-lived) greenhouse gas. Thus, it has
been argued that on a “life cycle” basis it is not clear that the natural
gas revolution will yield a reduction in greenhouse gases overall.
Fortunately, producers have an economic incentive to minimize gas
leaks, because it costs them money. This incentive, plus new EPA
regulations designed to reduce fugitive gas emissions, will hopefully keep
natural gas in the winning column in terms of climate effects. For a
review of the empirical literature, see Merrill and Schizer, supra note 50.
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replace the use of coal with natural gas in Europe, Asia, and the rest
of the developing world, as well as in the United States. This could
happen. One small step in the right direction would be for the United
States to develop a robust export industry in liquefied natural gas.69
This would help make a partial transition to gas possible in countries
like Japan. Of course, the more we export gas, the higher the price of
gas in the United States, which could slow down the transition to gas
here. Longer term, other countries in Europe and Asia are likely to
adopt fracking technology themselves, and expand their own gas
reserves. A small step in this direction would be for the United States
to encourage the export of fracking technology to countries on other
continents. Twenty years from now, we could be seeing China
switching from coal to gas based on the development of new gas
reserves using fracking technology on shale deposits in China.
Another variable in all this is oil. If fracking technology in the
United States and elsewhere expands the production of oil, this will
tend to hold price increases in oil in check. Lower prices of oil,
relatively speaking, will encourage more cars and more driving, which
will add to the total volume of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide.
Electric cars may provide a partial answer to this. But again, if the
electric cars sold in China are recharged with electricity coming from
new coal burning plants, little will be gained. So it all comes back to
the coal plants in China.
A third variable to add to the mix is the impact of the fracking
revolution on renewables. Cheap gas, as I said at the outset of these
remarks, is poison for renewables. If we assume that technology
stands still from now until the end of the twenty-first century,
renewables will never be able to compete with cheap gas without
massive government subsidies. And the lesson of history, at least in
the United States, is that subsidies for alternative fuels are not
politically sustainable.70 In a static technological world, the best bet
for heading off climate change risk would probably be to press ahead
on all fronts to promote the use of fracking in generating cheap gas.
But of course, technology does not stand still. Over time, there is
reason to believe we will achieve a technological breakthrough in
renewables, analogous to the breakthrough achieved with fracking.
Which brings me back to my first question—how to stimulate
innovation in the production of energy. To promote innovation, the
government should strive to create the conditions in which
69.

Exporting liquefied natural gas is difficult technically, and further
complicated politically. LNG export plants require approval from the
Department of Energy, which has been withheld in recent years due to
political pressures. Currently, only one out of over twenty potential
LNG export terminals has received federal approval. See Better Out
Than In, Economist, Mar. 2, 2013, at 13.

70.

Graetz, supra note 27 at 153–54.
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entrepreneurial ventures thrive. Another constructive form of
government intervention here would be a carbon tax, which would
seek to equalize the social costs of carbon fuels and renewables, and
thereby put renewables on a level playing field with carbon fuels.
When are countries most likely to adopt a carbon tax? When the
price of carbon fuels is going down, not up.71 And what is it that is
most likely to bring the price of carbon fuels down in the foreseeable
future? Fracking.
So I would conclude that a conscientious citizen concerned about
global warming should support the fracking revolution. Cheap gas will
upend nuclear and renewables at least temporarily, but more
importantly it will displace coal. If this can be done on a global basis,
big progress will have been made against global warming. Cheap gas
and potentially cheaper oil also make it more likely that legislatures
will agree to adopt a carbon tax, which could help stimulate
innovation in renewables over the long term. Cheap gas is thus
probably the best strategy on the horizon for reducing greenhouse
gases, until we see a technological breakthrough in renewables. And
the only way to get cheap gas is to support fracking.

71.

See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an
Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization
Plan, 27 Yale J. Reg. 1 (2010). This is partly a function of loss
aversion or the endowment effect: imposing a tax when prices are stable
or rising is experienced as a loss, whereas imposing a tax when prices are
falling is experienced as forgoing a potential gain. Id. at 29.
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